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ABSTRACT
SECURE MULTIMEDIA COMMUNICATION
IN SMART DEVICES
REINFORCED BY USING ONE-TIME KEYS
O¨MER MERT CANDAN
M.Sc. Thesis, July 2017
Supervisor: Prof. Albert Levi
Co-supervisor: Asst. Prof. Cengiz Tog˘ay
Keywords: one-time key, multimedia communication, smart card, hash chain, security
Recently, smart devices have become more and more prevalent in the daily life. The
spread of these devices introduced various use cases; however, communication has al-
ways been their primary functionality. With the development of WebRTC (Web Real-
Time Communication) and the availability of this technology on smart devices, applica-
tions offering real-time multimedia communication features will become more pervasive.
Though WebRTC presents a promising set of standards and interfaces for the task of car-
rying data from one end to another, there are security issues that are left in the hands of
the application developers. In this thesis, we aim to achieve secure multimedia commu-
nication by tackling the key generation and distribution issue of WebRTC platform using
a smart card for secure storage and operations. We tested different cryptographic algo-
rithms on smart cards, and resultantly we designed a mechanism based on hash chains.
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This mechanism allowed synchronous generation of keys at both sides. The mechanism
was implemented and tested on different brands of Java Cards. The results of the tests
indicate that it is possible to produce a key under one-second time. In addition, the re-
sults were analyzed to optimize generation times of particular keys by adjusting chain
length parameter of the mechanism. Consequently, the key generation method was inte-
grated into Media Security Platform of Netas¸ Telecommunications A.S¸., which is based
on WebRTC. The integration was performed under the guidance of a signaling scheme
drafted for the message traffic for the key agreement. In conclusion, the successful in-
tegration and better results indicate an improvement over a previously used public key
system.
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O¨ZET
Akıllı Cihazlarda Tek Kullanımlık Anahatar
ile Gu¨c¸lendirilmis¸
Gu¨venli C¸oklu Ortam I˙letis¸imi
O¨MER MERT CANDAN
Master Tezi, Temmuz 2017
Danıs¸man: Prof. Dr. Albert Levi
Es¸-danıs¸man: Asst. Cengiz Tog˘ay
Anahtar So¨zcu¨kler: tek kullanımlık anahatar, multimedya iletis¸im, akıllı kart, o¨zet
zinciri, gu¨venlik
Son yıllarda akıllı cihazlar gu¨nlu¨k hayatta o¨nemli bir yer edindi. Bu cihazların yaygınlas¸ması,
onlara birc¸ok yeni is¸lev kazandırmakla beraber, yine de temel amac¸ları iletis¸im olarak
kaldı. WebRTC (I˙nternet Tabanlı Gerc¸ek Zamanlı I˙letis¸im) teknolojisinin ortaya c¸ıkması
ve akıllı cihazlarda kullanılabilir olması, gerc¸ek zamanlı multimedya iletis¸imine olanak
veren uygulamaların artmasına neden olacaktır. WebRTC’nin amacı uc¸tan uca bilgi tas¸ınması
ic¸in standartlar ve programcı arayu¨zleri belirlemek olsa da, is¸in gu¨venlik kısmı uygu-
lama gelis¸tiricilere bırakılmıs¸tır. Bu tezde, akıllı kartların sag˘ladıg˘ı gu¨venli depolama
ve is¸lem o¨zelliklerinin yardımı ile, WebRTC ic¸in gu¨venli anahtar u¨retilmesi ve dag˘ıtımı
sorunları ele alınarak gu¨venli c¸oklu ortam iletis¸imi kurulumu hedeflenmektedir. Deg˘is¸ik
kriptografik algoritmalar akıllı kartlar u¨zerinde denenmis¸ ve sonuc¸ olarak o¨zet zinciri
vi
u¨zerine bir yo¨ntem kullanılmasina karar verilmis¸tir. Tasarlanan mekanizma deg˘is¸ik marka
Java kartlar u¨zerinde calıs¸tırılmıs¸ ve testlerin sonucları 1 saniyenin altında bir su¨rede
anahtar u¨retiminin mu¨mku¨n oldug˘unu go¨stermis¸tir. Buna ek olarak, o¨zet zinciri uzunlug˘u
deg˘is¸tirilerek c¸es¸itli analizler yapılmıs¸ ve bunun sonucunda hedeflenen bir anahtarın mu¨mku¨n
olan en iyi su¨rede u¨retilebilmesi ic¸in gerekli olan zincir uzunlukları hesaplanmıs¸tır. De-
vamında, anahtar u¨retimmekanizmasınınWebRTC teknolojisine dayananMedya Gu¨venlik
Platformu ile entegrasyonuna yer verilmis¸tir. Mekanizmanın sisteme uyumu ic¸in tasar-
lanan sinyalles¸me trafig˘i go¨z o¨nu¨ne alınarak, entegrasyon bas¸arı ile tamamlanmıs¸tır. Sonuc¸lar,
daha o¨nce kullanılan ac¸ık anahtarlı sisteme go¨re daha iyi performans alındıg˘ına is¸aret et-
mektedir.
vii
dedicated to everyone who’ve been patient with me,
especially my family
viii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Special thanks to Prof. Albert Levi, my advisor and a major contributor of this thesis.
I am truly grateful for his endless guidance and sincere attention.
I also thank my co-supervisor Asst. Prof. Cengiz Tog˘ay for his contributions and support
along the way.
I learned a great deal from the lectures of Assoc. Prof. Selim Balcısoy, Asst. Prof.
Kamer Kaya and Prof. Dr. Erkay Savas¸, and thank them for participating in my defense
jury.
The project under which this thesis has been produced has been supported by T.C. Min-
istry of Science, Industry and Technology under San-Tez program grant STZ.0805.2014
(later the project has been taken over by TU¨BI˙TAK TEYDEB grant 112D032).
ix
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1 Introduction 1
2 Background 4
2.1 WebRTC (Web Real-Time Communication) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2 Java Card . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.3 Cryptographic Hash Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.3.1 Preimage Resistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.3.2 Second Preimage Resistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.3.3 Collision Resistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.4 HMAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.5 One-Time Password . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.5.1 HOTP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.5.2 TOTP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.6 Hash Chain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3 Proposed Method 15
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.2 Proposed Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.3 Call Establishment Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.3.1 Possible Scenarios During Key Establishment . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.3.2 Distribution of Seed Values into Smart Cards . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.4 Integration with Media Security Platform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
x
3.4.1 Pre-integration Preparation Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.4.2 The Integration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4 Performance Evaluation 36
4.1 Key Generation Timings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4.2 Calculating the Optimal Chain Length for a Target Key . . . . . . . . . . 38
4.3 Post-integration Timings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
4.4 Memory Usage on Java Card . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
5 Conclusion 43
xi
LIST OF TABLES
3.1 Unit Times on Different Cards (ms) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.2 Error Codes of the Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
4.1 The Optimal Chain Lengths for Selected Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
4.2 Tests with MSP Application Using SHA-1 in Netas¸’s intranetwork . . . . 41
4.3 Tests with MSP Application Using SHA-256 in Netas¸’s intranetwork . . . 41
4.4 Tests with MSP Application Using SHA-256 outside Netas¸ network . . . 41
4.5 Memory Usage of Applets on Java Card . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
xii
LIST OF FIGURES
2.1 Key Agreement in WebRTC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2 Overview of Public Key Setting in Media Security Platform . . . . . . . . 6
2.3 Smart Card Chip . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.4 Java Card Architecture (taken from [9]) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.5 Preimage Resistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.6 Second Preimage Resistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.7 Collision Resistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.8 Lamport’s Password Authentication Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.1 Hash Chain Tests Using SHA-1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.2 Hash Chain Tests Using SHA-256 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.3 Hash Chaining MS1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.4 Hash Chaining MS2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.5 Second Phase of the Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.6 Two Way Hash Chain Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.7 Signalling Protocol for Media Security Platform. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.8 Test Application on Android . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.9 Result of a Test Run on Android . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.10 SHA1 Chain Length with Android . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.11 SHA256 Chain Length with Android . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.12 JavaCardApi Class . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.13 JavaCardKey Class . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
xiii
3.14 JavaCardApiIml Class . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.15 API Calls After Integration with the Media Security Platform . . . . . . . 31
3.16 The Caller Initiating in Android Application . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.17 Caller Sends the Call Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.18 The Callee’s Screen After Receiving the Call Request . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.19 The Call is Accepted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.20 The Call has Started on Caller’s Application . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.21 The Call has Started on Callee’s Application . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
4.1 Tests with Different Chain Lengths (ms) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
4.2 Generation Time of Different Keys (ms) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
xiv
Chapter 1
Introduction
The technology of mobile devices has shown a great deal of improvement over the
past decade. While this fast paced trend continued, the devices became more powerful
and smaller in size. The transformation from brick-like phones to pocket sized phones,
from room-sized computers to handheld tablets led these devices invade daily life. All
the mobile devices, ranging from a smart watch to a portable personal computer have one
aspect in common, that is Internet connectivity. The major demand of Internet access
provoked the rapid development of the infrastructure of Internet as well as the services
that rely on it. One of these services, namely WebRTC (Web Real-Time Communication),
aims to allow audio and video communication over the Internet [23]. Since the Internet
is publicly accessible and therefore insecure, WebRTC is designed to provide security by
end-to-end encryption. What WebRTC does not provide is a standard for generation and
distribution of the keys required for the security of the communication.
Media Security Platform (MSP) developed by Netas¸ Telecommunication A.S¸., tack-
les the problem of key generation for multimedia communication in WebRTC environ-
ment. The platform utilizes a public key cryptography based setting, each participating
user having a public/private key pair. The mobile environment is not the ideal place to
store private keys [20]; therefore they are stored in smart cards which also provide secure
cryptographic functions. In the existing MSP of Netas¸, before establishing a secure com-
munication channel, parties generate a session key and encrypt it with the public key of
1
the other party. The encrypted key is sent after being signed with the sender’s private key.
Four modular exponentiation operations are needed in this setup, two of them performed
in the smart card environment, which slows the initiation process before call. Our main
purpose is to devise a mechanism that will shorten the time required by the initial signal-
ing process. The proposed scheme will allow remote users to create a unique and common
key in a secure and an efficient way. To eliminate the cost of communication spent for
key exchange, we came up with a structure based on the idea of hash chains. The users
will create their keys by applying hash functions in a chain-wise manner to some initial
data. Since this is a deterministic process, applying hash chain on the same data would
yield the same result for different users. In order to generate the same key at both ends,
both parties need to share a secret information beforehand. The security of the protocol
we design depends solely on the shared secret, namely the “seed”. Therefore, the seeds
will be stored inside smart cards and any computations on them will also be performed in
the card. The whole key generation operation begins and ends inside the card, only the
result is visible at the end of the operation. This way, the seeds or the intermediate values
generated from the seeds never leave the card. The possible security threats existing in
the mobile environment are circumvented with this approach.
We have set out to design a new key generation system that produces one-time keys
in a type of smart card called Java Card. Java Cards provide secure storage and atomic
transactions on a Java-based environment [3]. The product of our design had to meet strict
security requirements. One of these requirements was the security of the future and past
keys generated by the users of the platform. We had to keep in mind that, in the event of
a key compromise, none of the past keys should be revealed. In addition, when a key is
captured, our mechanism must keep on producing consequent keys not guessable by any
means. The other requirement was that two separate parties must have been able to pro-
duce the same key without exchange of information. Another requirement was to produce
these keys in a timely manner. To achieve these requirements, we knew that the involving
parties should share some information ahead of time. However, this shared information
is the most vulnerable part of the whole setting. Therefore, we have made the decision
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to choose an external device that will store this information, process this information and
display an output when needed. The choice of smart cards, especially Java Cards for our
case brought upon its challenges. We have noticed that the smart card platform is indeed
very limited in the aspect of memory and computing power. These restrictions made us
realize that we are not free in our decisions while we are designing our system. As a
result of this, we have moved to perform tests with different cryptographic algorithms.
As soon as we received the results of our tests, we observed significant performance dis-
parity between them. Some of the algorithms have performed considerably slow or did
not work at all on the smart cards. After a brief analysis of these preliminary results, we
determined the main component of our design by the process of elimination. Therefore,
we attained to design a scheme that does not only work in theory, but is feasible, im-
plemented and tested on real devices. Our main contribution can be attained to the fact
that our mechanism is designed carefully to perform well in the current restricted state of
smart card technology. We have performed necessary tests on smart cards and shown that
the mechanism does work successfully under one-second threshold, which is acceptable
in the context of real-time applications.
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we provide some back-
ground information necessary for understanding the basis of the work. In Chapter 3, we
explain our design and how it works in detail. The reasons behind the choices made in
the design will be revealed. We will provide steps for generating a single key. Chapter 4
consists of the performance evaluation of the provided scheme. We disclose the tests and
their results. In Chapter 5, we provide a conclusion to wrap up.
3
Chapter 2
Background
2.1 WebRTC (Web Real-Time Communication)
WebRTC (Web Real-Time Communication) is a collection of APIs for modern browsers,
such as Google Chrome andMozilla Firefox, that enable peer-to-peer Real-Time Commu-
nication (RTC) without plugins or other requirements [22]. The components of WebRTC
technology provide infrastructure for high quality audio, video and other data transfer be-
tween browsers or any application that implement the WebRTC API. The aim of WebRTC
project is to provide a set of standards that will define the future of web based communica-
tion. WebRTC is an open source project, which makes it an important move for web based
technology in a sense that relieves developers from relying on proprietary solutions. The
media transfer between clients happens in a peer-to-peer fashion; however, this transfer
of information is preceded by an initiation process that requires a server in between. With
the help of an intermediary server, the clients have to exchange information to establish
the channel with the help of Session Description Protocol (SDP) [8]. These initialization
events are part of the signaling process which is designed to overcome the difficulties in-
troduced by Network Address Translation (NAT) [19]. Translation of dynamic addresses
to private addresses and vice versa puts a hold on the possibility of creating an immedi-
ate peer-to-peer connection[1]. Interactive Connectivity Establishment (ICE) framework
comes into action at this point; it helps to initialize the connection by trying out different
4
connection methods, when the channel cannot be established with convenience [18]. The
key agreement part of the signaling phase is relevant for the scope of our work.
Figure 2.1: Key Agreement in WebRTC
In Netas¸’s Media Security Platform, key agreement happens at the signaling phase,
shown in Figure 2.1. The key generated by the caller’s smart card is encrypted with the
public key of the other party and transferred to the demanding application. The encrypted
key is signed by the application and sent to the intermediary Media Security Server, which
then transfers the key to the receiver of the call. The callee verifies the signature and
passes the encrypted key to the smart card for decryption. The plain key returned from the
smart card is used to establish a secure multimedia communication channel. An overview
of this public key based scheme is shown in Figure 2.2.
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Figure 2.2: Overview of Public Key Setting in Media Security Platform
2.2 Java Card
Smart cards are widely used in areas such as banking, security systems, personal
identification and so on. A smart card is a plastic card that houses a chip containing a
Central Processing Unit (CPU), Read-Only Memory (ROM), Electrically Erasable Pro-
grammable Read-Only Memory (EEPROM), Random Access Memory (RAM) and a unit
for input/output operations, simply presented in Figure 2.3. For the time being, smart
cards carry approximately 1KB of RAM and 64KBs of flash memory space (EEPROM).
The ROM section of the smart card is used to store the operating system of the smart card
and is not accessible by developers. The contents of RAM is lost when the smart card is
unpowered, while EEPROM provides persistent but very slow storage compared to RAM.
Smart cards are operated by a card reader or sometimes called Card Acceptance Device
(CAD) that is connected to a computer, a terminal or as in our case a smart device. The
card operators provide power and clock signals to the chip embedded in the card.
Smart cards are assumed to securely store its contents, however, this assumption may
not always hold true. While current smart cards are marketed with the promise of tamper-
resistance, there have been various tampering techniques introduced in the past [10]. In
our case, the smart card environment is a far better alternative to implement our key
generation mechanism into than the operating system environment of a smart device.
Java Card is a specific type of smart card that utilizes a restricted subset of Java Envi-
ronment. Java Cards are initialized in the manufacturing process with Java Card Runtime
6
Figure 2.3: Smart Card Chip
Environment (JCRE) written in their ROMs. EEPROM stores the applications on Java
Card - or applets - and static data related to those applets, while the RAM is used by the
applets as temporary storage during runtime. JCRE holds Java Card Virtual Machine and
Java Card API on top of which the applets operate, as illustrated in Figure 2.4. Contrary
to the earlier smart card applications, Java Card applets work on any card that runs JCRE,
independent of the brand of the chip. A Java Card can hold multiple applets and provides
a firewall to restrict access between said applets.
7
Figure 2.4: Java Card Architecture (taken from [9])
2.3 Cryptographic Hash Functions
A hash function produces a fixed size of output, also called hash value or digest,
from inputs of any length. Hash functions are very fast and utilized for various purposes
in security. An example usage might be to produce the hash of a long document and
securely store this hash for future verification that the document is not modified. If there
is a modification in the document, then applying the hash function on the modified version
will create a digest that does not match with the original hash. Since the input space is
often larger than the output space, the outputs of the hash functions are not in one-to-one
correspondence with the inputs. This means that the hash function might map different
inputs to the same hash value. The case where two different inputs give the same hash
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result is called a collision.
Cryptographic hash functions are a sub-type of hash functions that satisfy some se-
curity properties. The security of hash functions depends on preimage resistance, second
preimage resistance and collision resistance [17].
2.3.1 Preimage Resistance
From the output of the hash function, it must be difficult to find the input that produces
the hash value. The hash value should not reveal any information about the input.
Figure 2.5: Preimage Resistance
2.3.2 Second Preimage Resistance
For an input and its hash, it must be difficult to find a different input that produces the
same hash value.
Figure 2.6: Second Preimage Resistance
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2.3.3 Collision Resistance
It must be difficult to find any input pairs that produce the same hash output.
Figure 2.7: Collision Resistance
2.4 HMAC
HMAC (Hash-based Message Authentication Code) is a cryptographic mechanism
providing integrity check by validating messages using a secret key [11]. It involves a
cryptographic hash function and a secret key. The hash function should be an iterative
function that operates on blocks, such as a hash function from SHA family [7][6]. The
name of the HMAC scheme is correlated with the underlying hash function, for example
if SHA-256 is being used the scheme is called HMAC-SHA-256. In addition, the security
of HMAC depends heavily on the quality of the hash function. With this in mind, crypto-
graphically secure hash functions such as SHA-256 and beyond are often the choice for
HMAC operations. Calculation of HMAC of messageM using key K and hash function
h is as follows.
HMAC(K,M) = h(K   opadkh(K   ipadkM)) (2.1)
HMAC consists of two hash operations involving the message, the key and constant
values called ipad and opad. Let us assume that the hash function operates on blocks of
size b and produces a hash output of size n. The ipad and opad constants are 64 bytes
long byte strings and are repetition of the bytes 0x36 and 0x5C, respectively. As the first
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step of HMAC process, if needed, the key is padded with zeroes until it is of length b.
Padded key is XOR’ed with the ipad, then concatenated with the message which forms
the inner part. The first hash operation is applied on this inner part. As the next step, the
padded key is XOR’ed with the opad, then concatenated with the digest coming from the
previous step to form the outer part. The second hash operation is applied on the outer
part to produce the result of the HMAC operation as seen in Equation 2.1.
2.5 One-Time Password
As its name suggests, one-time password algorithms are designed to produce pass-
words that are supposed to be used only once. The main advantage of this scheme is to
prevent attack scenarios where the adversary captures a previously used password. Imple-
menting one-time password systems usually are not as straightforward as implementing a
system that depends on a single (master) password. Therefore, other devices come to help
in the one-time password settings in the creation of one-time passwords. This is known
as two factor authentication and its security depends on not only what the user knows
but also on what the user possesses. There are different algorithms to produce single use
passwords. We will discuss two of them, one is based on HMAC and the other one uses
the time as a source of input.
2.5.1 HOTP
HMAC-based One-Time Password Algorithm (HOTP) [13], uses a key, a counter and
HMAC-SHA-1. Obviously the key must be kept secret and should be of adequate length
which is at least 160 bits suggested in the RFC document [13]. After a run of HOTP,
the counter value is incremented. This scheme guarantees that for every iteration of the
algorithm, the outcome will be different than the previous one. By sharing a secret key,K,
and a synchronized counter, C, two remote parties can successfully generate a one-time
password as shown below.
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HOTP (K,C) = Truncate(HMAC -SHA-1 (K,C)) (2.2)
Let us assume that we want to have a result with d digits after the execution of HOTP
algorithm. HOTP algorithm applies HMAC-SHA-1 on counter with the key, then selects
specific bits of the result and shortens it to d digits as in Equation 2.2. The truncation
process looks at the low-order 4 bits of the last byte of the HMAC output. This becomes
the index to the bytes that will be selected again from the HMAC result. The bytes that
are in the range of [index, index + 3] will make up a 32 bit number. As a final step,
modulo operation is applied with modulus being 10d, to get the result in the expected
range.
2.5.2 TOTP
TOTP (Time-based One-Time Password Algorithm) is very similar to HOTP [14].
The only difference is that TOTP uses Unix time as its counter value.
TOTP = HOTP (K,T ) (2.3)
Here in equation 2.3, T is the number that represents how many time steps have been
taken from a determined initial time. Assuming that the initial time is determined as T0,
and a time step is defined as X , we calculate the number of time steps in Equation 2.4
below.
T =
 
CurrentT ime  T0
X
⌫
(2.4)
2.6 Hash Chain
A hash chain is produced by applying hash operation on a given data successively.
When hash functions are chained, the result of one hash becomes the input of the upcom-
ing hash function. If we represent the hash function with h and the length of the hash
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chain with L, then the hash chain F is:
hL(m) = h...h(h(h(m))...)| {z }
L times.
(2.5)
The idea of chaining hash functions first appears in the seminal work of Lamport [12].
In the context of remote authentication, a password is used for identification. Instead
of choosing a single password and sending this to the server for every access, a scheme
based on chaining hash functions is proposed. The user chooses an initial value x and
applies hash chain operation on this value. Let us assume that, the length of the hash
chain is 1000, which indicates that the hash is taken 1000 consecutive times. The user
shares the result of the hash chain with the server, so the server has F 1000(x). When the
user wants to identify to the server, the previous hash in the chain is sent. Thus, the user
calculates F 999(x) and sends it to the server. For verification, the server takes the hash of
the incoming message from the user and compares it with F 1000(x). If the authentication
is successful, the server keeps F 999 and expects to receive F 998 the next time the user
wants to access.
Figure 2.8: Lamport’s Password Authentication Scheme
The security of the hash chain method depends on the one-way property of the un-
derlying hash function. This guarantees that, it is very difficult to find F y 1 from F y.
Therefore, capturing previously used passwords will not allow to produce future pass-
words to be used later on. However, obtaining an intermediate hash from a hash chain
structure does give away the forward part of the chain since moving forward is simply ap-
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plying a hash function. In our proposed scheme, this problem is taken into consideration
and dealt with.
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Chapter 3
Proposed Method
3.1 Introduction
In this section, we explain our new key generation structure in detail. We will intro-
duce the smart card environment and demonstrate the preliminary test results. The results
of test implementations on the cards will reveal the resolution process behind the choices
we have made. Then, we will present our two-way hash mechanism step by step.
Our aim, as we have pointed out before, is to generate one-time encryption keys on
remote parties for voice/video communication. However, this does not come naturally.
Being able to reach the same key requires some pre-shared knowledge. This shared se-
cret, however, is the most essential element concerning the security of the key generation
process. Therefore, it is of utmost importance that the shared values must never be dis-
closed to the outside world. The applications on smart phones are able to store these
mentioned secrets, but they do not provide a secure storage. However, the smart cards do
make the promise of secure data storage.
We have chosen to work with Java Cards, a type of smart card that runs Java ap-
plets. Like other Java applications, Java Card applets run on a virtual machine called Java
Card Virtual Machine [3]. This provides separation between the applet and the underly-
ing structure of the card and allows for an applet to be run on different Java Card brands
without an issue. There may be more than one applet on the same card. With the applet
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Table 3.1: Unit Times on Different Cards (ms)
Algorithm Variant FeitianA22
Feitian
A40 NXP JCOP
G&D Java
Card
HMAC SHA1 35.7 29.5 45.3 36.8
HMAC SHA256 55.3 48.4 55.5 39.8
HOTP HMAC-SHA-1 42.6 36.3 50.2 44.0
RSA
2048 Encrypt 59.0 49.0 205.0 289.7
RSA
2048 Decrypt 677.0 607.0 742.0 767.1
firewall in Java Cards, the applets have no access to each other’s data, if not explicitly
allowed. The data in an applet is stored in persistent memory (ROM). There is a small
non-persistent memory (RAM) to store temporary results of operations. Java Cards are
inserted into card reader devices and they are powered through them. When the card is
unpowered, the RAM is reset and the data residing in RAM is lost. Overall memory in
Java Cards are very limited and usually do not exceed 64 KB. There are different versions
Java Card Platform Specifications, and the cards are designed according to one of these
specifications. Although the cards are supposed to perform the specified operations in the
documents, the cards usually have documented and undocumented missing functionali-
ties. In addition, the performance of the cards are highly varying. While one operation
on a card is performed fast, the same operation takes noticeably longer on another brand
of Java Card. Since the environment have such restrictions and quirks, initial tests were
performed to measure the performance of basic operations. Table 3.1 shows the timing
results of some operations tested on different cards.
We have also tested hash chain operations with different chain lengths. Figures 3.1
and 3.2 show how timings vary with different chain lengths and hashing algorithms.
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Figure 3.1: Hash Chain Tests Using SHA-1
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Figure 3.2: Hash Chain Tests Using SHA-256
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3.2 Proposed Structure
After a brief analysis of the preliminary tests, we have selected hash chain to be the
main component of our key generation method. One-time password scheme proposed
by Lamport which is shown in Figure 2.8, utilizes the hash chain in a straight forward
manner. The one-way property of the hash function used in the chain guarantees that even
if one of the keys are compromised, none of the future keys can be generated. However,
previously generated keys until the captured key are easily produced. For our case, the
secrecy of the communication depends on the cryptographic key used in that session.
Therefore, if any of the past keys are discovered, then the encrypted communication can
be deciphered. With this in mind, we set out to draft a scheme that will not only provide
security of future conversations, but the past conversations as well. In an event of a key
compromise, our scheme should withstand attacks on both past and future keys. The
property of backward secrecy requires that if a key is compromised, this must not allow
discovery of the keys used in the past. For the other way around, if a system satisfies
forward secrecy, then previously captured keys must not lead to prediction of any future
keys. As these definitions imply, an important requirement of our system is to ensure both
backward and forward secrecy [16]. As a result of this requirement, we have decided to
use two separate hash chains. This way, we would be generating keys that would be
combination of the results of two hash chain operations, preventing the discovery of past
keys.
The purpose of our mechanism is to generate the same keys on two different ends.
This is only possible using some secret information that is being known by the involving
parties. This secret information, or master seed, will be the only factor that the security
of our mechanism depends on. The seeds will be written in secured area of smart cards
and in no circumstances the seeds will leave that secured area.
Our decision to use two way hash chains requires two separate seeds and we have
named these seeds as MasterSeed1 and MasterSeed2. In addition, we have decided
to follow a two-dimensional approach. Therefore, our mechanism needs to keep two
different counters for each dimension. These counters are both set to one when the cards
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are initialized. We have named these counters simply i and j for the first dimension and
the second dimension respectively. The second dimension constitutes the two way hash
chain part of our method. We have limited the number of keys generated for each value
of the counter (i) in the first dimension. We call this the chain length of our mechanism
and represent it with L shortly. Then, the first operation of our mechanism is performing
hash chain operation of length i on these seeds as shown in Figures 3.3 and 3.4.
Figure 3.3: Hash Chaining MS1
Figure 3.4: Hash Chaining MS2
The intermediate results of chain hashing MasterSeed1 (MS1) and MasterSeed2
(MS2) is represented by R1 and R2 respectively. This concludes the first step of the
mechanism. The second phase of the mechanism involves applying hash chain operations
on R1 and R2. R1 is chained j times whereas R2 is chained L  j times, thus, in total L
hash operations are performed. Then, the results obtained from the hash chain operations
in the second dimension are XOR’ed together to generate a key, shown in Figure 3.5.
Figure 3.5: Second Phase of the Mechanism
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Figure 3.6: Two Way Hash Chain Mechanism
The complete picture of the mechanism is shown in Figure 3.6. Whenever a key is
generated, the counter j is incremented. If j reaches the chain length value L, then it is
set back to one and the counter i is incremented. This means, for each i, we produce L
keys in total, before moving on to the next value of i.
3.3 Call Establishment Protocol
The hash chain mechanism provides a secure way to generate one-time keys. This
mechanism can be set up on different ends with the same parameters to generate synchro-
nized keys. In our case, we plan to provide keys to Media Security Platform which is a
real world application developed by Netas¸ Telecommunications A.S¸. Since it is quite pos-
sible that the synchronization might be lost in a real life scenario, we devised a protocol
to remedy that.
Let us define a limit to the number of tries when generating keys to match a given
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Figure 3.7: Signalling Protocol for Media Security Platform.
key. From here on, we represent this number with ✏. We set ✏ at the initialization process
where we load and install our mechanism to the smart cards.
Assuming that SmartPhone1 initiates the call, the protocol follows these steps:
1. SmartPhone1 requests a key from SmartCard1.
2. SmartCard1 produces the next key and returns it back to SmartPhone1, Smart-
Phone1 generates the hash of the received key, by performing hashed key1 =
h(key1).
3. SmartPhone1 generates a call request using the WebRTC library. The call request
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and the hashed key1 is sent to SmartPhone2.
4. SmartPhone2 transfers the hashed key1 to SmartCard2, requesting a key to be
generated.
5. At this point, SmartCard2 keeps producing keys until ✏ number of keys have been
produced or until it produces a key with the hash that matches with hashed key1. If
the same key on both ends are generated, SmartCard2 returns this key and produces
an error code of 0. If the keys do not match after ✏ keys, SmartCard2 returns the
first key it generated along with an error code of -1.
6. SmartPhone2 hashes the key returned from SmartCard2, by hashed key2 = h(key2)
operation and transfers call response and hashed key2 to SmartPhone1.
7. If the received hashed key2 is a match with hashed key1, SmartCard1 moves
to step 9. If not, hashed key2 is transferred to SmartCard1 and another key is
requested.
8. SmartCard1 keeps producing keys until ✏ keys have been produced or until it pro-
duces a key with the hash that matches with hashed key2. If a matching key is
found, this key along with an error code of 0 is returned back to SmartPhone1. If
not, SmartCard returns an error code of -2, then moves to step 10.
9. Both parties possesses the same key and the call begins.
10. The parties have not established a key, the call is dropped. Resynchronization is
needed.
11. The call is terminated by one of the parties.
The error codes produced by the cards are defined in table 3.2
3.3.1 Possible Scenarios During Key Establishment
We will shortly refer to the client initiating the call as client A, and the client at the
receiving end as client B. The most common case is both clients’ cards stay synchronized,
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Table 3.2: Error Codes of the Protocol
Error Code Description
0 The key is generated successfully.
 1 The key generation failed. The first available key is re-
turned.
 2 The key generation failed. Resynchronization required.
if the protocol and the mechanism produces keys without any mishap. In this situation,
client A’s smart card is ready to produce the next key; likewise the smart card of client B is
going to produce the exact same key. When client A begins the call, hashed key1 will be
received by client B and subsequently sent to the smart card of B. At this point, B’s card
will produce a key identical to the one on the caller’s side. Client B sends hashed key2
across and upon receiving the hash value client A verifies that a common key is created.
Client A will initiate necessary operations to begin the call.
One alternative scenario to the one mentioned above is the clients’ cards might be out
of synchronization within the specified limit ✏. Assuming client A (caller) has produced
more keys than client B, therefore is forward in the mechanism compared to client B
(callee). When client A initiates the call, hashed key1 sent to B will not match the first
key generated by smart card of B. However, since the synchronization is not broken out
of the boundary of ✏, B’s card will eventually find the matching key and return this key
along with 00 error code. The rest of the call setup will progress in the same manner as
the synchronized scenario.
A similar scenario is the reverse of this situation where client B (callee) is in forward
position in the mechanism. When this happens, hashed key1 received from client A
cannot be matched by client B’s smart card, because the mechanism only moves in the
forward direction. Upon not being able to find a matching key after trying ✏ keys in
the sequence, smart card of B returns the first key it tried. Then, this key is hashed
(hashed key2) and transferred back to client A. When hashed key2 is received by client
A’s smart phone, it will discover that a common key has not been established. Next,
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another key generation command is sent to A’s smart card, this time requesting a key to
be matched with hashed key2. Since the synchronization is still intact within ✏, the smart
card of A will catch up to the key produced on client B’s card. Consequently, the common
key will be established and the call will begin afterwards.
The last possible scenario is the cards being more than ✏ away from each other. When
this is the case, all the events mentioned in the paragraph above will take place. The only
difference is that, A’s smart card will not be able to find a matching key, therefore returning
error code of  2. This error code is an indicator to the fact that the synchronization is
broken beyond (✏) the usual flow of the protocol and needs to be established externally.
In this condition, the call is aborted and the intermediary server is notified.
3.3.2 Distribution of Seed Values into Smart Cards
Although it is not in the scope of project and thesis, we offer methods for the gener-
ation and distribution of seed values. If the clients are in physically separated environ-
ments, then the seeds can be generated and shared in a Diffie-Hellman setting [5] using
the application interface. A second suggestion for the remote client scenario is using an
alternative secure channel to share the seed values This secure channel is only needed
during the exchange of seeds. After the seeds are exchanged, they are stored in the secure
area of the smart cards and never leave the card afterwards.
If the clients are in the same environment, then the seeds can be shared by the Blue-
tooth interface of the devices. Another possible method is relying on QR codes to display
the seeds created by one party and then detect them by the other party. It might also be
possible to transfer seed values between clients by simply inputting them as hexadecimal
characters in the application.
3.4 Integration with Media Security Platform
In this section, we provide details on the integration of our key generation method
with the ongoing Android application side of the Media Security Platform. The process of
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integration consists of two steps. The first being the preparation work before introducing
our code into the platform and the second step is the actual merging of the mechanism
into the call establishment phase.
3.4.1 Pre-integration Preparation Work
The motivation behind the design of the key generation mechanism was providing
keys to an application running on smart devices, especially those that run Android Oper-
ating System. Therefore, we have developed an application on the Android platform using
a library that provides support for communication between the application and the smart
card reader [2]. With this application, we are able to send commands to the smart card
and receive the responses produced by the card, illustrated in Figures 3.8 and 3.9. We
have performed our preliminary tests using the Android application, and discovered no
discrepancy between these tests and the previous test run on a laptop computer. In Figues
3.10 and 3.11, we present tests on different chain lengths, which are the most relevant
ones in the context of our mechanism.
We have designed an Application Programming Interface (API) for the interaction
between Java Card and the Android application. Encapsulating the details of command
execution in Java Card, the API offers simple functions to ease the integration process.
In addition, when the smart card side of the project requires modification, the application
does not need to be modified as well. This avoid the necessity of repeating the whole
integration phase in the likely event of a minor change in our mechanism. We have defined
three separate classes for the API which are overviewed in the following part of this
section.
JavaCardApi class
In this class, as represented in Figure 3.12, we define all of the data members and method
necessary to communicate with the Java Card. The card is connected to the smart device
via a card reader attached to the one of the USB ports. The first step of reaching the
card is to be able to control the USB interface through an UsbManager object defined.
Then, the card reader device is stored in a UsbDevice object, after the manager connects
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Figure 3.8: Test Application on Android
to the reader. Following that, communication with the actual reader interface requires a
definition of a Reader variable provided by the external library. In addition, the generated
key is stored in a byte array along with another byte array for the error code produced.
The constructor of this class needs two parameters, one UsbManager and one UsbDe-
vice. When an object of this class is created, the parameters are provided by the applica-
tion and set into the corresponding member variables. The initialize method defines the
Reader object and starts the reader that is linked to the UsbDevice. The presence of a
card in the reader is being queried with the checkCard method, which returns true when
the card is inserted and false otherwise. Actually connecting to the card and providing
power is possible by connectCard class method.
When the caller is in need of a key, generateKey method is called. This method,
firstly, selects the applet on the smart card that is responsible for key generation. If the
applet is selected and the PIN verification process is successfully completed, a command
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Figure 3.9: Result of a Test Run on Android
for key generation is sent to the card. The card is expected to return a key and an error
code to this method, and this method itself returns an object (JavaCardKey) to its caller.
In our signaling scheme, the parties hash their keys before transmitting them across
the channel. When the hashed key is received, the recipient produces a key of its own. For
this, generateKeyWithLimitmethod is called with the received hashed key supplied as
a parameter. The smart card then produces a series of keys until a match is found or the
preset number of tries has been reached. If a matching key is found, the key is returned
alongside with an error code of 0x00. If not, the first tried key is returned with an error
code of either 0x01 or 0x02, depending on the side performing the operation. If the callee
does not successfully create a matching key, then the error code is 1, in the caller’s case
the error code is output as 0x02. The result of this method is collected in a JavaCardKey
object and returned, as it happens in the generateKey method.
Media Security Platform requires 96 bytes long keys in order to establish a call be-
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Figure 3.10: SHA1 Chain Length with Android
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Figure 3.11: SHA256 Chain Length with Android
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Figure 3.12: JavaCardApi Class
tween its clients. We performed our tests by using hash chains with SHA-1 algorithm. The
output of SHA-1 hash is only 20 bytes long, leaving us short of 76 bytes when compared
to the actual key length in need. We lengthen our key by using a known data expansion
method called P hash [4]. The final method in this class, createSrtpKey gets 20 a bytes
key and returns a 96 bytes long key created using P SHA1 method.
Figure 3.13: JavaCardKey Class
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JavaCardKey class
This class is a simple container for a key and related information about the key as seen
in Figure 3.13. The first member variable, success is set to false if an error occurred
during the generation of the key. This variable is an indicates that whether the key is
available or not. The second variable holds the error code returned from the card. The
error variable may take following values: 0x00, 0x01 or 0x02. The key variable stores
the key generated and returned by the smart card. The last member variable, hashedKey
is used to store the hashed version of the key.
Figure 3.14: JavaCardApiIml Class
JavaCardApiIml class
This class encapsulates the previously defined JavaCardKey and JavaCardApi classes,
and provides singular methods. The purpose of the design of this class is to further ease
the integration by gathering multi-line commands under one operation. A UML represen-
tation of this class is presented in Figure 3.14.
3.4.2 The Integration
As the first step, we merged our Java Card interface with the Media Security Plat-
form’s code base. From the Android application, appropriate API functions are called in
the signaling phase. In Figure 3.15, which functions are supposed to be called at what
point are shown.
The first task of the integration was to create a listener for USB permission in the
Android application of the platform. This listener is required, because without an external
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Figure 3.15: API Calls After Integration with the Media Security Platform
USB device permission, the card reader does not work at all. When the card reader is
plugged into the USB port of the smart device, the listener catches this event and creates
a prompt displaying a permission request to use the USB device. After the permission is
granted, the card reader is powered up, and subsequently the application connects to the
smart card.
The following events take place when a client (the caller) decides to call another client
(the callee). The application on the smart device of the caller, inside its RtcManager
class, prompts the first key to be generated. The key returned from the smart card is
stored inside a srtpKey variable, and at the same time a hashed version of the key signed
and placed inside a call request. The call request is sent to the intermediary server which
then transfers it to the application of the callee. On the callee’s side, the call request is
captured in a method named onCallOfferCatched insideWebSocketManagerHelper
class. The hashed version of the key contained in the call request is extracted and provided
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to the callee’s smart card. As expected the smart card generates a key and an error code.
If the callee chooses to answer the call, the key returned from the smart card is hashed
and sent back to the caller in the positive response. Otherwise, the the call is cancelled
and the caller’s notified of the termination.
When the callee accepts the call, the caller receives a hashed key produced and sent
by the callee. At this point, the caller has two hashed keys, one of which produced by the
other party. The caller compares these hashes, if the hashes are found out to be the same
the call is started with the established key. If the hashes turn out to be different, then the
caller sends another key generation command to its smart card with the received hashed
key. This second key generation is placed inside the method onCallAnswerNotify
inside CallFragment class. The smart card tries to generate a matching key, returning
0x00 if a matching key is found and 0x02 if the matching key cannot be found. The call
starts after the application verifies the error code to be 0x00. Receiving an error code of
0x02 indicates that the call cannot be started, furthermore the synchronization between
the clients are broken exceeding the limits defined by the mechanism.
Here, we present a flow of a call establishment process in the Android application of
MSP. In Figure 3.16, the caller is displaying the key generated in the smart card.
Figure 3.16: The Caller Initiating in Android Application
The call request has been sent to the receiver of the call, as indicated in Figure 3.17.
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Figure 3.17: Caller Sends the Call Request
Then, the callee’s application prompts its smart card to generate a key and displays that
key. The callee can either accept or reject the call at this time, as shown in Figure 3.18.
Figure 3.18: The Callee’s Screen After Receiving the Call Request
The callee accepts the call, shown in Figure 3.19
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Figure 3.19: The Call is Accepted
The call establishment is completed and the secure communication begins. Figures
3.20 and 3.21 display the screens of both caller and callee, respectively.
Figure 3.20: The Call has Started on Caller’s Application
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Figure 3.21: The Call has Started on Callee’s Application
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Chapter 4
Performance Evaluation
4.1 Key Generation Timings
While the production of the keys, our mechanism performs certain number of hash
operations. As we produce more and more keys, the time it takes to produce future keys
increases. Though, this increase can be controlled by adjusting the chain length of our
mechanism. However, the adjustment cannot be done dynamically, in other words, the
chain length of our mechanism does not change after initialization. Therefore, we need
to determine the chain length at the beginning while considering the key generation per-
formance it entails. Measuring key generation times for different chain length setups, we
have produced a graph shown in Figure 4.1. We have tested our mechanism by setting its
chain length to 100, 200, 300, 400 and 500.
Our mechanism works in two phases. In the first phase, there are two separate hash
chains, each of length i. Thus, the number of hash chain operations in the first part sums
up to 2⇥ i. In the second phase, there are again two hash chains, one of length j and one
of length L j. The number of hash operations done in the second phase always add up to
L no matter the value of the counter j. Then, we can conclude that for a key, the required
number of hash operations depends on the value of the counter i and the value of L at the
time of production. As a matter of fact, the number of hash operations is equal to 2⇥i+L.
As we produce keys, the value of the counter i will naturally increase and this will result
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Figure 4.1: Tests with Different Chain Lengths (ms)
in longer times to produce new keys. If we set a relatively small chain length L for our
mechanism, then we ensure that the initial keys will be produced faster, because L will be
relatively low. Similarly, in a longer chain length setting, the initial keys will require more
hash operations, and more time because of the large L. This situation is reversed when
the number of keys generated increase. For later keys, the small chain length setups do
require more time than the longer chain length ones. This is due to the fact that for each
value of counter i, the number of keys produced is exactly L. Therefore, the i counter
increases rapidly when the value of L is relatively smaller, which then causes late keys to
be generated at a slower rate.
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4.2 Calculating the Optimal Chain Length for a Target
Key
As mentioned earlier, the completion time of a hash chain operation is directly pro-
portional to the number of hash operations it entails. For a key, our mechanism performs
four different hash chains along with an XOR operation. The XOR operation takes neg-
ligible amount of time, when compared with the rest of the key generation process. This
allows us to make an estimate about the performance of our mechanism by calculating the
total number of hash operations. As we have pointed out in Section 4.1, each key requires
2 ⇥ i + L hash operations. Now, we want to adjust the chain length L for the kth key,
so that it is generated in the shortest time possible. The kth key is produced after k   1
keys have already been produced, so the values of the counters i and j for the kth key are
shown below.
i =
⇠
k
L
⇡
(4.1)
j = k mod L (4.2)
We have shown that the total number of hash operations n is,
n = 2i+ L (4.3)
If we replace i with kL , then we get the total number of hash operations in terms of k
and L.
n =
2k
L
+ L =
L2 + 2k
L
(4.4)
Since we want to optimize the number of hash operations, we take the first derivative
of the Equation 4.4 and then set it to zero. This gives us an optimal chain length L for the
kth key in the production as shown in Equations 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7.
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dn
dL
= 1  2k
L2
(4.5)
1  2k
L2opt
= 0 (4.6)
Lopt =
p
2k (4.7)
We have experimented with different chain lengths and with different keys and recorded
the production times. For an iteration of our experiment, we have set the chain length
value to an integer in the range [50, 700]. Then, we produced the 10000th, 25000th,
50000th and 75000th key for each chain length. As expected, each key is associated with
a chain length that minimizes its production time, as can be seen in Figure 4.2.
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Figure 4.2: Generation Time of Different Keys (ms)
Analytically, the optimal chain length is calculated as
p
2k (Equation 4.7). We present
a comparison between analytical values and the results from our experiments with varying
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chain lengths. As shown in Table 4.1, analytically expected optimal chain lengths and the
actual optimal chain lengths do have significantly close values.
Table 4.1: The Optimal Chain Lengths for Selected Keys
Production Number of
Key
Expected Optimal Chain
Length (Analytical)
Actual Optimal Chain
Length (Experimental)
10000 141 137
15000 173 177
20000 200 200
25000 224 228
50000 316 311
75000 387 389
4.3 Post-integration Timings
After we successfully integrated our mechanism to the Media Security Platform, we
found the opportunity to test the integrated application inside the company’s network.
The results of these tests with using SHA-1 and SHA-256 algorithms are shown in Tables
4.2 and 4.3, respectively. Each test measures the time it takes for both clients to be ready
to establish call. In the testing process, the flow of events happen as introduced in our
signaling protocol presented in Figure 3.7. The caller party creates a key, introducing
the first delay. Then, this key is sent inside a call request to the recipient party which
introduces a network delay while in transfer and processing delays by the applications.
Finally, the recipient party generates a key which increases the overall time to establish
end-to-end encryption. Therefore, the timing measurements are higher when compared to
timings of a single key generation operation, due to delays introduced by the the network
and the applications.
The results reveal a performance gap between the hash algorithms used by the mecha-
nism. SHA-1 performs better than SHA-256 as expected. Though, our tests with a specific
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Table 4.2: Tests with MSP Application Using SHA-1 in Netas¸’s intranetwork
Brand of Card Chain Length (L) Time (ms)
Feitian A22
100 1580
200 1890
Feitian A40
100 1630
200 1780
G&D
100 1570
200 1790
Table 4.3: Tests with MSP Application Using SHA-256 in Netas¸’s intranetwork
Brand of Card Chain Length (L) Time (ms)
Feitian A22
100 2490
200 3400
Feitian A40
100 2200
200 3860
G&D
100 1590
200 1880
Table 4.4: Tests with MSP Application Using SHA-256 outside Netas¸ network
Brand of Card Chain Length (L) Time (ms)
Feitian A22
100 2540
200 3820
Feitian A40
100 2640
200 4010
G&D
100 1850
200 2150
brand of Java Card, namely G&D, indicate the possibility of using SHA-256 without too
much performance degradation. We have also tested the MSP application with SHA-256
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on a network outside of Netas¸’s, and discovered results close to ones found in tests done
inside Netas¸ network. The results, displayed in Table 4.4, show that SHA-256 is feasible
when run on an efficient card, even in outside networks where the delay is higher.
4.4 Memory Usage on Java Card
It is not possible to detect memory usage of an applet on Java Card. However, there is
an alternative method to estimate the memory usage. The Java Card displays the amount
of free memory when probed. We developed the following approach in this context.
Firstly, we inquire the free memory from the card, then we load our applet and perform
another query to obtain the free memory on the card. By calculating the difference be-
tween our inquiries, we are able to find out how much memory our applet consumes on
the card. We present the memory consumptions of the tested applets in Table 4.5. Our
hash chain mechanism applet consumes around 1000 bytes of memory, which is minimum
among other mechanisms.
Table 4.5: Memory Usage of Applets on Java Card
Name of the Applet Memory Usage (Bytes)
HMAC 1220
HOTP 1048
RSA 2048 2570
Hash Chain
Mechanism
1006
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
WebRTC is a developing technology that allows development of multimedia commu-
nication applications with ease. Still an ongoing project to offer neat interfaces for the
future of software, WebRTC does not provide a standard method for key management.
In this thesis, we delve on the issue of key generation and key distribution for the Media
Security Platform being built by Netas¸ Telecommunications A.S¸. We founded a method
to generate synchronous keys on remote ends with the help of embedded security of smart
cards, our scheme depends on fast hash operations. Our key generation mechanism per-
forms better than previously used approach of generating keys relying on a public key
setting. We have implemented and tested our solution on different brand of smart cards
and then integrated our mechanism to the Android application offered by Media Security
Platform. After the integration, we have achieved to establish audio and/or video calls
with the keys generated by our key generation algorithm.
The clients in the Media Security Platform communicate with other clients after they
mutually agree on a friendship relation. Our solution for key management currently does
not address this situation. We provide the actual seeds of friends manually into each of
the smart cards while we initialize the applet that runs the mechanism. For future work, a
secure method to establish friendships for the clients can be proposed and implemented.
For this, the seeds of the clients should be generated privately and transferred into the
cards. The same approach can also be used when previously bonded clients lose synchro-
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nization beyond the limits set before. When two clients need to be resynchronized, they
should be provided with brand new set of seeds on their cards.
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